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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(j)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Nielsen agrees with the "Statement of Issue Presented" in 
Colbys' brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-3 (1995) which states as follows: 
Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Colbys leased commercial premises from Nielsen. Nielsen 
filed suit against the Colbys in May 1996 seeking termination of 
the tenancy and restitution of the premises. Nielsen presented a 
written lease to Colby in October, 1995 and directed him to: 
1) sign the lease; 2) have his wife sign the lease; 3) get each 
signature notarized, and 4) return the signed lease to Nielsen. 
(Record 239) 
In conjunction with Nielsen's Complaint, an Order to Show 
Cause was issued, asking the Court to rule that no written lease 
was in force between the parties. A hearing was held on June 17, 
1996. At that time, the district court took proffers of evidence 
which were stipulated to by counsel (Record 192, 196). The Court 
found that the lease had never been signed by the Colbys and 
Colbys were in arrears on the rent payments. The Court directed 
judgment to be entered. (Record 205). An "Order and Judgment of 
Restitution" was entered on July 1, 1996. (see Exhibit 1 of 
Appellants' brief). 
The Colbys next filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for 
Stay of Execution, which included affidavits disputing the number 
of checks which failed to clear the bank, and also claiming that 
Mr. Colby signed the lease the day it was presented to him. (No 
claim has ever been presented asserting that Mrs. Colby signed 
the lease before the eviction order was served on Colbys or that 
signatures were notarized, or that the lease was returned to 
Nielsen). The district court denied this motion (Record 216), 
finding that all conditions precedent and necessary for 
acceptance were not met. 
The Colbys then retained new counsel, and filed a Motion for 
Relief from Judgment or in the Alternative, for Stay Pending 
Appeal with additional affidavits. (Record 046-083). This 
motion was denied by the district court after hearing on July 29, 
1996. (Record 243). However, the court granted the Colbys7 
motion to stay the effect of its ruling, leaving the Colbys in 
possession, and this appeal followed. The Colbys are still in 
possession at the present date. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Darrell Nielsen (Nielsen) owns commercial real estate with a 
street address of 761 West 12th Street, Ogden, Utah 84404. The 
defendants, Carl Colby and Marie Colby, his wife, dba Super 
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Savers Store, occupied the premises on a month-to-month rental 
basis prior to October of 1995. (R. 001, 037) 
In October 1995, the plaintiff presented a lease agreement 
to the defendants and stated that if they wanted to continue to 
occupy the premises, they would have to enter into the lease 
agreement. (Record 002, 037, 193). In early October 1995, 
Nielsen and Carl Colby met. Nielsen told Colby that he would 
have to sign the two copies of the lease agreement, have his wife 
sign the lease, have them notarized and return them to Nielsen, 
to have the lease become valid. (Record 193). 
Mrs. Colby failed to sign the lease (Record 193, 038), 
failed to have their signatures notarized, and failed to return 
the lease agreements to Nielsen. In the ensuing months, the 
lease agreements were never returned and Nielsen made several 
phone calls to Colbys to have them sign the agreements and return 
them. (Record 193). On most occasions, Colby tried to put 
Nielsen off and said that he had not signed them, or had not yet 
had his wife sign them, and they had not yet been notarized. 
(Record 193, 194) 
Thereafter, several payments made by Colby to Nielsen failed 
to clear the bank and were returned to Nielsen for insufficient 
funds. (Record. 192-195). 
Nielsen made continual efforts to contact Colbys to apprise 
them that they needed to sign the lease agreement, and that the 
checks had to come in a timely manner. (Record 194). 
On June 17, 1996 a hearing was held before Judge Stanton M. 
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Taylor; the facts were stipulated to the court, including the 
fact that Mr. Colby never signed the lease agreement, never had 
his wife sign it, and did not have it notarized, and never 
returned the lease to Nielsen (Record 196, 239). Additionally, 
Mr. Colby's attorney stipulated that at the date of the hearing, 
several checks had been unpaid on their rent. On the record, the 
court asked the defendant's attorney why Colby hadn't signed the 
lease agreement and delivered it to Nielsen. (Record 203). 
Mr. Medsker: "He said he saw no reason. Just didn't 
get around to it. Wasn't — he felt that he was in 
there lawfully. He felt that the lease would continue. 
He wanted to stay. He just said he never got around to 
signing it. He signed it the day he brought it into 
our office and — which would have been shortly after 
he was served with this. I don't know that he has any 
excuse for not signing it. He just didn't." 1 
Based upon the evidence before the court, on June 17, 1996 the 
court ruled that the lease was withdrawn by the March 28 eviction 
letter, which constituted a withdrawal of the offer to enter into 
the lease. (Record 203). The Colbys were in a month-to-month 
tenancy, that a proper eviction notice had been served, and the 
defendants were to vacate the premises. (Record 204). The 
defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and filed 
affidavits in connection therewith, and then Mr. Colby said that 
he signed one copy of the lease on the date he and Mr. Nielsen 
In defendants' answer which has never been amended, 
defendants also state: 
"Defendants acknowledge that the lease agreement was 
not executed by them until the purported eviction 
notice was given to them, but that the said lease 
agreement was executed by plaintiff and acknowledged to 
be in force by defendants." (Record 013) 
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met in early October, 1995. (Record 019). Mr. Colby was told to 
take the lease, have his wife sign it and get it notarized and 
return it to Nielsen. (Record 239). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Colbys never accepted the lease. Under the best facts, they 
don't dispute that Mrs. Colby never signed the lease (until she 
did so in her attorney's office) and the lease was never 
notarized or returned to Mr. Nielsen. Colbys were habitually 
late in making payments. The trial court was correct in ruling 
that no written lease existed, and since it was a month-to-month 
tenancy, Mr. Nielsen could terminate the tenancy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT MR. COLBY NEVER ACCEPTED THE 
CONTRACT IN QUESTION. 
Mr. Nielsen drew up a lease agreement and expressly 
specified the manner in which it was to be accepted. He directly 
stated face-to-face with Mr. Colby that the lease was to be 
signed by him, and by his wife. He further stated that it should 
be notarized and returned to him. Mr. Colby agreed that these 
were the conditions that were spoken by Mr. Nielsen to him. 
(Record 239). He further agreed that he did not carry out these 
conditions precedent. The District Court, as a matter of law, 
interpreted the contract to contain conditions precedent. Morris 
v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 
1200 (Utah, 1983). 
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Basic contract law declares that when an offer specifies the 
manner in which it must be accepted, it can only be accepted in 
that specific manner. Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 
v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). Conditions 
precedent are those that must occur or be performed before 
contract takes effect and is enforceable. Arnold v. S.J.L. of 
Kansas Corp.. 822 P.2d 64, 67 (Kansas, 1991); Medical Services 
Group. Inc., v. Boise Lodge No. 310, 878 P.2d 789, 793 (Id. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
The case cited by defendants on the position that only one 
signature would make a lease enforceable against the signer is 
not applicable in this case. In Commercial Union Associates v. 
Clayton. 863 P.2d 29, 36-37 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) it was the 
lessees who sought to avoid the lease, and claimed that the 
corporate entity had never signed the lease and therefore it was 
not binding. The Court of Appeals and the trial court recited 18 
separate Findings by the trial court, showing the parties acted 
as if their lease was signed. 
There are substantial factual differences in this matter. 
(a) Mr. Colby had been operating under a month-to-
month lease for over six (6) years before he asked for a 
lease agreement. Several rent increases were agreed to, 
paid, and received during those six (6) years. 
(b) Colby had requested a Lease Agreement, which was 
presented to him for signing, and the parties clearly agreed 
on a rental amount. Neither party materially changed their 
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position in reliance upon a lease being entered as was done 
in the Commercial Union case, and the parties operated on a 
month-to-month tenancy as they had previously done. 
(c) No material or substantial alterations of the 
building were made, and no reliance was made that a lease 
was in effect. 
Basic contract law provides that when an offer is made and 
not accepted, then the contract is not valid. Mr. Colby did not 
return the lease in a timely manner. Mr. Nielsen revoked the 
lease and therefore no lease existed. 
The signing of the lease by Mr. and Mrs. Colby before a 
notary public was a condition precedent to the contract. By his 
own affidavit, Mr. Colby admits he was to have the lease signed 
by his wife and notarized and returned to Nielsen. (Record 239). 
This constitutes a "condition precedent" to having a valid lease. 
Utah Courts recognize conditions precedent. see Commercial Union 
Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993) at 38. 
The failure to have the lease signed by Colby and his wife 
notarized, and returned makes the lease invalid. 
The Court of Appeals of Utah noted that for an offeree's 
response to constitute acceptance, the offeree must manifest a 
definite intention to accept the offer and every 
part thereof, without material reservations or conditions." Cal 
Wadsworth Construction v. St. George. 865 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1993). Colby's actions show no sign of accepting the 
offer according to the conditions precedent. Colby's wife never 
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signed the contract. The contract was never notarized or 
returned to Mr. Nielsen. (Record 239) 
The defendant incorrectly argues that the acceptance of the 
rental payments constituted acceptance of the lease, and 
therefore a contract was created. As stated above, a contract 
cannot be accepted in any other way than specified by the 
expressed terms of the offeror. Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Co.. v. Ross. 849 P.2d at 1992. In the history of the 
rental of the building to the defendant, the monthly rental was 
raised several times without an official written lease. (Record 
069). Mr. Nielsen raised the monthly rent several times without 
an official written lease. (Record 069). Mr. Nielsen tried 
several times to get Mr. Colby to carry out the conditions of the 
lease. Mr. Colby knew of the conditions and consistently made 
excuses for not following through with them. Neither party acted 
in a manner that would constitute acceptance to the written 
contract. 
The defendant argues that Mr. Nielsen is estopped from 
denying the validity of the written lease. The law of equitable 
estoppel is "conduct by one party which leads another party, in 
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in 
detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate 
his conduct." Crismon v. Western Co. of North America. 742 P.2d 
1219, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The defendant seems to suggest that Nielsen's conduct leads 
the defendant to rely on the contract. A careful examination of 
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the evidence seems to suggest exactly the opposite. Mr. Nielsen 
repeatedly attempted to contact Mr. Colby in order to retrieve a 
signed copy of the lease. He made many phone calls to Mr. Colby 
demanding the completion of the expressed terms of acceptance. 
He made several trips to the store of Mr. Colby to retrieve the 
lease in question. These facts show that Mr. Nielsen made it 
very clear to Mr. Colby that the lease had not been completed 
because Mr. Colby had never accepted the offer and returned the 
lease in accordance to the expressed conditions. 
Mr. Nielsen is under no obligation to follow a lease that 
was not accepted by the expressed conditions precedent. Medical 
Services Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310. 878 P.2d at 793. 
His revocation of the offer terminated any consideration between 
the two parties. Estoppel does not apply when conditions 
precedent were not met by the party trying to enforce the lease 
at hand. Mr. Nielsen's conduct clearly demonstrated that 
performance of the conditions was necessary to create a binding 
contract. 
Mr. Colby did not want the burdens of the lease, but was 
hoping to have all benefits of the lease, but the law will not 
allow him to do so. 
II. 
SUMMARY EVICTION WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE 
LACK OF A CONTRACT CREATED A MONTH-TO-MONTH 
TENANCY. 
The court correctly concluded that a month-to-month tenancy 
existed when Mr. Colby did not accept the contract. 
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The district court correctly followed rulings of the Utah 
Supreme Court when it concluded that a month-to-month tenancy 
existed when the contract was not accepted. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated that when "nothing more is shown than payment and 
receipt of rent, the result at common law is a tenancy at will or 
at most of one from year to year." Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 
438, 440 (Utah, 1968). 
When rent is paid on a monthly basis, the most appropriate 
tenancy is a month-to-month tenancy. The case at hand parallels 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake Citv v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1989). The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that when 
the tenants failed to timely renew their lease agreement, the 
tenant's holding over of property did not create a new lease. 
Instead, it resulted only in a month-to-month tenancy which 
terminated when owners gave tenants written notice of their 
intention to terminate the lease. See also Schartz v. Foster, 
805 P.2d 505, 506 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). 
The District Court correctly concluded that a month-to-month 
tenancy was created, and that Mr. Nielsen legally delivered an 
eviction notice to the Colbys based on the month-to-month 
tenancy. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
JUDGMENT WHEN NO MATERIAL FACTS 
WERE DISPUTED IN THIS CASE. 
The district court correctly granted judgment when it ruled 
that a contract had not been established. "Judgment [should be] 
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granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists and moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." B & Assoc, v. 
L.A. Sons Construction Co.. 796 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah, 1990). 
In the case at hand, the material issues of the contract are 
not in dispute. Both the plaintiff and the defendant agree on 
the material issues. The defendant indicated that he would have 
to have a lease agreement to continue the tenancy with the 
defendants. Nielsen presented a lease agreement and expressly 
stated that both Colby and his wife sign the agreement, that it 
be notarized, and that it be given back to Nielsen. Colby freely 
admitted that Nielsen directly advised him of these expressed 
conditions while handing him the lease. (Record 239). Both 
sides further agree that Colby's wife never signed the contract 
(until after the eviction notice was served) and that it was 
never notarized and returned to Mr. Nielsen. The plaintiff 
revoked his offer for the lease by personally delivering to the 
defendants an eviction notice on March 28, 1996. These 
undisputed facts directly support the judgment of the district 
court. 
IV. 
EVEN ASSUMING THE FACTS OF THE DEFENDANT 
TO BE TRUE, THE DEFENDANT STILL COULD NOT 
PREVAIL IN THIS CASE. 
In order for judgment to be granted, the court must construe 
the information and facts in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the judgment. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Insurance 
Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah, 1986). The case at hand directly 
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conforms to these regulations. Accepting the facts according to 
the defendant, there is still no issue of fact as to whether 
Colby properly accepted the offer. The defendant admits that Mr. 
Nielsen expressly stated the conditions precedent of the offer to 
him. Also, the defendant freely admits that he never notarized 
the document. The defendant also admits that his wife never 
signed the document in question until after Nielsen withdraw his 
offer. Accepting all his other facts as true, Mr. Colby never 
carried out the conditions precedent which would bind Mr. Nielsen 
to the contract. 
The defense tries to argue that there are many factual 
disputes in this case which exclude the use of summary 
disposition. The important distinction is that the factual 
disputes must be material to the outcome at hand. The Supreme 
Court of Utah has stated that "the mere existence of some factual 
disputes does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those 
issues are immaterial to resolution of the case." Horaan v. 
Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah, 1982). The 
facts here in question do not effect the outcome of the contract. 
The District Court analyzed the contested facts in this case and 
still concluded that the disputed facts did not effect the 
resolution of the case and would not change the fact that a 
contract had never been formed. (Record 239) 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly concluded that Mr. Colby never 
completed the conditions precedent to the contract and that a 
contract was never formed. The court was correct to conclude 
that no question of material fact existed in this case. Judgment 
was correctly granted in favor of Mr. Nielsen. 
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